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Abstract
Defensive dishonesty in criminal investigations has increasingly been prosecuted without
standards for identifying harmful deception or other meaningful checks on prosecutorial discre-
tion. Although they are often grouped together statistically and evaluated as comparable crimes,
there is a clear distinction between investigative lies and in-court perjury. The differences between
the offenses—including the standards for prosecution, the perceived victim, and the purposes of
bringing charges—suggest reasons to reconsider the current approach to investigative lies such
as false statements. More truth is produced, and arguably more cooperation results, when the
government focuses on the quality of the information flow. The structural protections in place
with regard to institutional perjury can be explained in part as truth-seeking tools, and I propose
translating warning requirements and distinctions between active and passive lies into the context
of investigative deception. Efforts to get accurate information could more effectively curtail evi-
dentiary foul play than strategies designed just to get defendants. And being attentive to whether
a false statement actually causes harm—a mitigating principle seemingly at work in the perjury
context—might further optimize deterrence.
∗Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law. This essay stems from remarks made at the
Evidence Section’s Program on “Evidentiary Foul Play: Deception, Destruction, and Just Deserts”
at the January 9, 2009 meeting of the American Association of Law Schools. My thanks to Chris
Sanchirico for organizing the panel, to participants in the program for their constructive comments
and questions, and to Craig Callen for his editorial contributions.
INTRODUCTION 
 
In this essay, I contrast the broad range of conduct within the ambit of the false 
statements statute that criminalizes investigative lies with the narrower scope of 
perjury liability in the institutional context of the courts.  The government more 
actively prosecutes defensive dishonesty outside of court, including lies induced 
by investigators.  Those prosecutions increase efficiency and symbolically assert 
government authority, but they create some distortions in the process.  I suggest 
translating the truth-seeking tools from court into formal warnings and a robust 
materiality requirement in the investigative setting.  That shift in focus from 
targeting defendants to obtaining accurate information could increase compliance 
in both general and specific terms.    
   
THE BROAD SWEEP OF INVESTIGATIVE LIES  
 
Process offenses that arise in the course of criminal investigations have often 
supplanted the misconduct that triggered the investigation as the focus of federal 
prosecutions.  This is particularly true of what I call investigative lies, which are 
defensive misrepresentations that arise from interviews with agents or 
prosecutors.  They are charged as false statements under 18 U.S.C. § 1001, which 
prohibits making a “materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or 
representation” or falsifying, concealing, or covering up “by any trick, scheme, or 
device a material fact” in any matter within the jurisdiction of the federal 
government.1  The breadth of the statute allows prosecutors to impose liability for 
lies that are induced by investigators and pose no risk to the investigation, as well 
as for statements made to non-governmental parties and subsequently passed on 
to the government.   
Actionable false statements under section 1001 can arise in the most 
informal of circumstances.2  Interviews often involve surprising suspects at odd 
hours in uncomfortable places, and the conversation at issue need not be 
transcribed or otherwise memorialized by agents.3  The informal setting does little 
to warn subjects about potential liability for their responses, and agents rarely 
frame interviews with any admonitions that would assure honest responses.  Nor 
is any precision required in terms of the questions or responses.4  False statements 
can concern topics other than the underlying wrongdoing, need not be in response 
                                                          
1
 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1996). 
2
 See, e.g., Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398, 410-11 (1998) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) 
(expressing concern about the “extremely informal circumstances” of agent interviews). 
3
 See United States v. Erlichman, 379 F. Supp. 291, 292 (D.D.C. 1974). 
4
 Compare Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352 (1973) (holding that “precise questioning is 
imperative” as a predicate for the perjury offense). 
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to clear inquiries, and can merely imply an inaccuracy or mislead by omission.5  
And once a witness responds to questioning, she “has an obligation to refrain 
from telling half-truths or from excluding information necessary to make [her] 
statement truthful.”6  Although there is a jurisdictional requirement in the statute, 
the statement itself need not concern a matter within a federal agency’s regulatory 
jurisdiction so long as the general subject matter of the investigation bears some 
relationship to the agency’s authority.7   
 The open-textured nature of the statute leads to the prosecution of induced 
offenses, which include deception that is organic and reactive, arising from the 
relationship between the defendant and the government and dependent on the 
context of the investigation.  It is a natural, self-protective instinct to “deny and 
conceal any shameful or guilty act.”8  This is true even of defendants who have no 
exposure to criminal liability but lie to avoid embarrassing revelations, for 
example by disguising a non-criminal indiscretion with a false alibi.  The initial 
response of most subjects confronted by criminal investigators is such an attempt 
to deflect scrutiny and forestall liability, and agents can exploit that instinct.  The 
statute thus allows for the possibility that “an overzealous prosecutor or 
investigator—aware that a person has committed some suspicious acts, but unable 
to make a criminal case—will create a crime by surprising the suspect, asking 
about those acts, and receiving a false denial.”9    
Recent examples of organic deception pursued as false statements come 
from all the “crying in baseball” over the use of steroids.  Most of the players 
involved did not commit underlying crimes and at worst engaged in off-label uses 
of substances that were not yet banned by Major League Baseball at the relevant 
time.  Yet several have come under scrutiny for statements they made to 
congressional investigators.  A congressional referral concerning Miguel Tejada 
asserts that he “materially influenced” the House Oversight Committee’s 
                                                          
5
 See United States v. Brown, 151 F.3d 476, 485 (6th Cir. 1998). 
6
 United States v. Cisneros, 26 F. Supp.2d 24, 42 (D.D.C. 1998); see also United States v. 
Gonzalez, 520 U.S. 1 (1997) (section 1001 covers false statements “of whatever kind”).  Cf. 
STUART P. GREEN, LYING, CHEATING, AND STEALING: A MORAL THEORY OF WHITE-COLLAR 
CRIME 78-79 (2006) (discussing “caveat auditor” principles, according to which “a listener is 
responsible, or partly responsible, for ascertaining that a statement is true before believing it”). 
7
 See, e.g., United States v. Yermian, 468 U.S. 63, 68-70 (1984) (government need not prove that 
defendant knew of federal agency jurisdiction). 
8
 See Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 160 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting); see also EVELIN 
SULLIVAN, THE CONCISE BOOK OF LYING 75 (2001) (“[O]nly a perpetrator who is repentant or out 
to be punished is honest.”); Richard Friedman, Character Impeachment Evidence: Psycho-
Bayesian [!?] Analysis and a Proposed Overhaul, 38 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 637, 652 (1990) (“How 
dire the consequences of the truth must be before a person is willing to tell a lie may differ from 
person to person, but it would be hard to deny that virtually everybody has a tipping point . . . and 
probably for most, the threat of serious criminal punishment is sufficient.”). 
9
 Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398, 416 (1998) (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
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investigation when he stated that another player, Rafael Palmeiro, had been 
truthful when he denied using performance-enhancing drugs in 2005.10  Another 
figure in athletics, track coach Trevor Graham, has been convicted in federal court 
of one count of lying to federal agents in a steroids probe.  When he was 
confronted by investigators in 2004, Graham claimed that he had no contact with 
a steroids dealer after 1997.  Before they approached him, however, prosecutors 
had obtained phone records documenting nearly 100 calls from Graham to the 
dealer between 1998 and 2000.  Jurors acquitted Graham of two additional counts, 
including falsely stating that he had never met the dealer in person.  After the 
verdict, one juror expressed skepticism about the case, wondering why there were 
no contemporaneous notes of the interview, and why Graham was not confronted 
with the phone records and other accusations.  “It was like they wanted to catch 
him,” the jury foreperson remarked, and “it got me to questioning the government 
themselves.”11 
The statute also criminalizes deception that takes the unadorned form of 
an “exculpatory no”: a false response to an investigator’s accusation with a 
version of “no,” or “wasn’t me.”  These reflexive reactions were once treated in 
the majority of circuit courts as constructive “not guilty” pleas,12 and courts 
recognized an “exculpatory no” defense to section 1001 charges until the 1998 
decision in Brogan v. United States.13  In Brogan, federal agents knocked on the 
defendant’s door one evening, unannounced.  As in the Graham case, before they 
went to his home, agents had obtained records verifying that Brogan had received 
funds from a company that employed members of the union for which he served 
as an officer.  The agents told Brogan that they were investigating the company 
and various individuals and asked him whether he had received any money or 
gifts from the company.  Brogan responded, simply, “no.”  Agents then told him 
that they had the records of payments to him and that he had just committed the 
crime of lying to them.  The Supreme Court subsequently affirmed Brogan’s false 
statement conviction, rejecting his “exculpatory no” defense on statutory 
interpretation grounds.14   
                                                          
10
 Letter from Henry A. Waxman, Chairman, Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform, H. Rep. & 
Tom Davis, Ranking Minority Member, to Michael B. Mukasey, Att’y General, U.S. D.O.J. (Jan. 
15, 2008). 
11
 See Amy Shipley, Graham Is Convicted of Lying to Investigators, WASH. POST, May 30, 2008, 
at E3. 
12
 See, e.g., Moser v. United States, 18 F.3d 469, 473-74 (7th Cir. 1994); United States v. Taylor, 
90 F.2d 801, 804 (8th Cir. 1990); United States v. Equihua-Juarez, 851 F.2d 1222, 1224 (9th Cir. 
1988); United States v. Tabor, 788 F.2d 714, 719 (11th Cir. 1986); United States v. Fitzgibbon, 619 
F.2d 874, 880 (10th Cir. 1980); United States v. Chevoor, 526 F.2d 178, 183-84 (1st Cir. 1975). 
13
 522 U.S. 398, 410 (1998). 
14
 See Brogan, 522 U.S. at 410. 
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The loose jurisdictional requirements in the statute also leave room for 
prosecutions of what I have termed derivative obstruction, which encompasses 
false statements made only in an indirect or constructive way to the government.  
Proxy deception is particularly common in the parallel realm of obstruction 
prosecutions under 18 U.S.C. § 1503.15  For example, one theory under which 
defendants in the Computer Associates case were prosecuted was that they knew 
statements they made to their own counsel would be passed on to the 
government.16  General Counsel Stephen Woghin was in turn indicted, partly 
because he professed innocence in a press release, provided false justifications to 
inside auditors, and “fail[ed] to expedite” the investigation.17  Along the same 
lines, Greg Singleton, a gas trader employed by El Paso Merchant Energy, was 
charged with falsely reporting market information, and the government added 
obstruction charges arising from statements that Singleton made solely to an 
outside law firm retained by his employer.18  According to the indictment, 
Singleton “did not disclose” to outside counsel, “falsely denied,” and “otherwise 
concealed” the fact that employees had provided false information to trade 
publications.  There was no allegation that Singleton made misstatements directly 
to the government.  Likewise, in the recent Rite Aid prosecution, defendants were 
convicted of obstruction largely as a result of interactions with internal 
investigators retained by the company.19 
The broad charging discretion prosecutors enjoy in the investigative 
context is constrained by more rigorous standards of proof when deception occurs 
in court.  Perjury has stringent statutory requirements, and the case law has further 
curtailed the reach of the perjury provision.  Liability requires a willful false 
statement as to material facts, made under oath.20  The Supreme Court has held 
that a defendant cannot be convicted if answers are literally true or merely 
                                                          
15
 See, e.g., Lisa Kern Griffin, Compelled Cooperation and the New Corporate Criminal 
Procedure, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 311, 371-73 (2007) (discussing derivative obstruction charges in 
various cases). 
16
 See Alex Berenson, Software Chief Admits to Guilt in Fraud Case, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 2006, 
at A1.  Kevin Ring, a defendant in one of the cases arising from the Jack Abramoff investigation, 
also was recently charged with obstruction for allegedly lying to private counsel retained to 
conduct an internal investigation. 
17 Information, United States v. Steven Woghin, 04 CR 847 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 2004).   
18 Superseding Indictment, United States v. Singleton, Crim. No. H-06-080, 2006 WL 1984467 
(S.D. Tex. July 14, 2006). 
19
 See Indictment at 76–80, United States v. Grass, No. 1:02-CR-00146 (M.D. Pa. June 21, 2002), 
available at www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/chargingdocs/grassetalind.pdf. 
20
 18 U.S.C. §§ 1621 & 1623 (2006).  The statutory definition leaves the common law 
requirements largely intact.  At common law, perjury was defined as “a crime committed when a 
lawful oath is administered, in some judicial proceeding, to a person who swears willfully, 
absolutely and falsely, in a matter material to the issue or point in question.”  4 WILLIAM 
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 136-37. 
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evasive,21 which leads to defenses that parse “the meaning of is.”22  In perjury 
cases, the allegedly misleading answer has less import than the precision of the 
questioning.23  Nor does perjury extend to superfluous testimony, and recantation 
in the same proceeding can provide a defense.24  Perjury also takes place in the 
formal context of official proceedings, and the requirement that the defendant 
make the critical statement under oath is calculated to “awaken the witness’ 
conscience.”25  Investigative lies present a sharp contrast: Rather than seek 
compliance with section 1001 ex ante, the government typically reveals its 
application only after subjects make the statements that give rise to liability.    
  
DEGREES OF EVIDENTIARY FOUL PLAY 
 
Different kinds of evidentiary foul play merit different treatment, and the effect of 
upstream investigative lies seems more likely to be diluted than that of 
institutional deception at the end of the adjudicative process.  Arguably, the 
rationale for the deterrence of deception changes and gathers force once a case is 
presented in court, where deceptive testimony hazards the destruction of evidence 
and is not just the refusal to cooperate with the government’s efforts to create 
evidence.   
The criminalization of investigative lies introduces sanctions for 
dishonesty at the first point in a suspect or witness’ interaction with law 
enforcement.  Falsehoods are actionable even before an investigation is fully 
underway and even when they pertain to topics unrelated to underlying 
wrongdoing.  They can occur, not because of consciousness of guilt, but because 
                                                          
21
 Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352 (1973); see also United States v. Shotts, 145 F.3d 1289, 
1297 (11th Cir. 1998) (“An answer to a question may be non-responsive, or may be subject to 
conflicting interpretations, or may even be false by implication, [but] if the answer is literally true, 
it is not perjury.”). 
22
 JEREMY CAMPBELL, THE LIAR’S TALE (2001) (quoting President Clinton’s legal brief to the 
Arkansas Supreme Court committee considering his disbarment) (“Many categories of responses 
which are misleading, evasive, nonresponsive or frustrating are nevertheless not legally ‘false’ 
[including] literally truthful answers that imply facts that are not true.”). 
23
 See Bronston, 409 U.S. at 362; id. at 360 (“[T]he perjury statute is not to be loosely construed, 
nor the statute invoked simply because a wily witness succeeds in derailing the questioner—so 
long as the witness speaks the literal truth.”).  
24
 18 U.S.C. § 1623(d). 
25
 See Robert P. Mosteller, Softening the Formality and Formalism of the “Testimonial” Statement 
Concept, 19 REGENT U. L. REV. 429, 439 n.45 (2007) (noting that the “function of the publicly 
administered oath”— which “impress[es] the witness’ mind with the duty to [testify truthfully]”—
“would appear qualitatively quite different in terms of its effect on solemnity” from the 
unannounced sanctions for false statements to investigators) (quoting FED. R. EVID. 603). 
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of consciousness of risk, or even indignation about innocence.26  Although false 
statements may inconvenience the government, perjury undermines far broader 
systematic goals and has an impact on the integrity of the court system.  In-court 
perjury is solvent to the social glue of the justice system, “an obvious and flagrant 
affront to the basic concepts of judicial proceedings.”27  The failure to cooperate 
may also cut off the flow of information to prosecutors and jurors and thereby 
prevent the “fine judgments”28 necessary in sound criminal investigations and just 
trials.  But actual evidence destruction more obviously “impedes the search for 
truth.”29  It “creates inaccuracy if the fact of destruction is unknown and 
uncertainty if the fact of destruction is revealed.”30  Penalizing evidence 
destruction “further[s] the interest of truth-finding and allow[s] the prosecution’s 
case to be put to the test.”31  Leveraging defensive false statements can have the 
opposite effect by inducing pleas for relatively innocuous conduct, mitigating the 
government’s trial risk, and reducing judicial oversight. 
Yet it is the earlier-stage deception that appears to inspire the most 
expansive enforcement strategies.  And Brogan, in which the Supreme Court 
enlarged the scope of section 1001 by rejecting an “exculpatory no” defense for 
investigative lies,32 pushes in the opposite direction from Bronston, which 
significantly contracted liability for perjury by requiring literal falsehoods rather 
than just misleading answers.33  Why has liability for false statements expanded 
while in-court perjury prosecutions have narrowed?  One explanation is that 
perjury is simply less prevalent than is widely assumed.34  Apart from anecdotal 
and impressionistic evidence, it is difficult to document the frequency of any form 
                                                          
26
 See, e.g., Lawrence Solum & Stephen Marzen, Truth and Uncertainty: Legal Control of the 
Destruction of Evidence, 36 EMORY L.J. 1085, 1161 (1987) (quoting Commonwealth v. Webster, 
59 Mass. (5 Chsh.) 295, 317 (1850) (“An innocent man, when placed by circumstances in a 
condition of suspicion or danger, may resort to deception in the hope of avoiding the force of such 
proofs.”)). 
27
 United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 576 (1976); see also United States v. Norris, 300 US 
564, 574 (1937) (“Perjury is an obstruction of justice; its perpetration may well affect the dearest 
concerns of the parties before a tribunal.”); GREEN, supra note 6, at 134 (noting that even if the 
jury’s verdict turns out to be correct, perjury seriously undermines the integrity of the system). 
28
 See Transcript of Patrick Fitzgerald News Conference (Oct. 28, 2005), available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/10/28/AR2005102801340.html (the 
harm of the obstruction charged in the Libby case is that it prevented prosecutors from “making 
the very fine judgments we want to make”).  
29




 GREEN, supra note 6, at 181. 
32
 See Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398 (1998). 
33
 See Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352, 353 (1973). 
34
 See Chris William Sanchirico, Evidence Tampering, 53 DUKE L.J. 1215, 1240-45 (2004) (noting 
competing media accounts and statistical disparities that highlight the difficulty of determining 
whether perjury is relatively under-enforced). 
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of evidentiary foul play.  But because the criminal lying prohibitions can be 
stretched to cover very ordinary human behavior, and because lying is an 
everyday occurrence, there is an obvious gap between statutory over-deterrence 
and on-the-ground under-enforcement.  Recent cases suggest that whether and 
when prosecutors choose to close that gap by prosecuting investigative lies has 
little to do with truth-seeking in the false statements context and more to do with 
the need for efficiency where those statements are pretexts for more serious but 
unprovable crimes, with the assertion of authority where defendants are 
recalcitrant, and with the desire for apology where defendants have failed to take 
responsibility. 
 
THE GOVERNMENT AS VICTIM OF INVESTIGATIVE LIES 
 
The government’s choice to exercise enforcement discretion as broadly as it does 
seems, in many false statement cases, to be a symbolic assertion of government 
power.  During investigations, prosecutors may view information as government 
property and see themselves as enforcing a corollary to the notion that “the public 
has a right to every man’s evidence.”35  The government, however, is not 
necessarily prosecuting falsehoods that succeed in defrauding the government 
itself, and by extension the public, of information.  There is both a stability 
interest in the force and meaning of “calling in the authorities”36 and a 
“‘collective interest’ that the people together hold in the integrity of the system 
overall, without regard to the effects to any particular victim or outcome of any 
particular case.”37  But organic or derivative deception is merely the failure to 
expedite an investigation or the refusal to acquiesce in the government’s theory of 
the trajectory of the case.  As Erin Murphy recently observed, with “obstinacy” 
charges, including false statements, “[t]he substantive offense is nothing other 
than the insult to the efficiency and authority of the state itself.”38   
By staying silent, defendants retain some power and put the government to 
its proof on the underlying charges.  By successfully deceiving the government, 
they exercise some control over the course of the investigation.  The 
criminalization of a broad range of investigative lies shifts the balance of power 
                                                          
35
 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974).  
36
 See JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS 63-64 (1984) (“Like community interests, governmental 
interests in the last analysis belong to individual citizens.  But the maintenance and advancement 
of a specific government interest may be highly dilute in any given citizen’s personal hierarchy.  I 
am not seriously harmed by a single act of contempt of court or of tax evasion, though if such acts 
became general, various government operations that are as essential to my welfare as public health 
and economic prosperity would no longer be possible.”). 
37
 Erin Murphy, The Crime Factory: Process, Pretext, and Criminal Justice, (manuscript at 5), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1279681.    
38
 Id. at 58.  
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back to the prosecution, enabling it to impose responsibility on the defendant for 
some offense, whether that is the original misconduct or the newly created crime.  
The line between criminal and noncriminal lying thus appears to have more to do 
with prosecutorial power and procedural expediency than social good.  Another 
celebrity athlete provides an example.  Marion Jones used performance-enhancing 
drugs in track and field and was then convicted under section 1001 for not owning 
up to it rather than for any underlying wrongdoing.  In her subsequent public 
apology, Jones made no mention of using the drugs or of her involvement in a 
counterfeit check scheme, although those were the subjects of the charged false 
statements.  Instead, she acknowledged that “[m]aking these false statements to 
federal agents was an incredibly stupid thing for me to do, and I am responsible 
fully for my actions.”39   
The pursuit of false statements as pretexts for other crimes or as leverage 
offenses to induce pleas underscores the adversarial posture in which the 
government approaches investigative interviews.  Although there is a veneer of 
truth-seeking and a cooperative relationship, agents and prosecutors often pursue 
questions with known answers.  Interviews resemble the “carefully staged 
drama[s]” of police interrogations, which have been described as “choreographed 
performance[s] that allow[] a detective and his suspect to find common ground 
where none exists.”40  In a trial setting, on the other hand, there is clarity about the 
adversarial nature of the process, overt concern about the defendant’s rights, and a 
systemic interest in encouraging testimony.41   
Arguably, recognizing, asserting, and preserving the court’s power as a 
shared social institution stands as a higher priority than enforcing the 
government’s authority to extract information from potential witnesses and 
suspects.  But perjury is prosecuted less often, and under less yielding standards, 
perhaps because the court’s institutional authority is less fragile.  Another 
explanation is that enforcement decisions for both perjury and false statements 
rest in the hands of the government.  False statements made in the context of civil 
discovery are rarely prosecuted, despite their potential (and often potentially 
greater) impact on judicial proceedings.42  When perjury is prosecuted, it often 
arises from the grand jury context, which is an extension of the government’s 
criminal investigation more than an arm of the court.  And as with earlier forms of 
                                                          
39
 Marion Jones’ Statement After Pleading Guilty to Lying to Federal Investigators, SPORTING 
NEWS, Oct. 5, 2007, available at http://www.sportingnews.com/yourturn/viewtopic.php 
?t=286406. 
40
 DAVID SIMON, HOMICIDE: A YEAR ON THE KILLING STREETS 209 (1991).   
41
 See Bronston, 409 U.S. at 360 (“The seminal modern treatment of the history of the offense 
concludes that one consideration of policy overshadowed all others during the years when perjury 
first emerged as a common-law offense: ‘that the measures taken against the offense must not be 
so severe as to discourage witnesses from appearing or testifying.’”).  
42
 Stuart P. Green, Uncovering the Cover-Up Crimes, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 9, 35-36 (2005).  
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investigative deception, the grand jury setting raises “the disturbing opportunity 
for abuse in conducting inquiries into ancient misdeeds of the witness, with the 
object of eliciting a denial that can then be charged as perjury.”43   
 
STRUCTURAL PROTECTIONS AND TRUTH-SEEKING 
 
Protections against perjury, moreover, are not limited to perjury prosecutions but 
are also embedded in the adjudicative process itself. 44  Although the actual goal 
of trial is contested, on one theory, trials are primarily an effort to get at the truth, 
or at least some outcome that will stand for the truth.45  Many investigations, on 
the other hand, privilege authority and efficiency over fairness and accuracy.  In a 
scenario where agents ask questions to which they already have answers, they 
want and expect guilty suspects to lie, and the statute arguably does little to 
protect the integrity of information-gathering.  Questioning may produce a 
confession or a supplemental charging option, but informational advances from 
these interviews are few, and only minimal investigative harms stem from 
unsuccessful ones.  A dishonest response in a confrontation with a suspect does 
little to harm the agency because a competent investigator “will anticipate that the 
defendant will make exculpatory statements.”46  Agents are seeking inculpatory 
statements or cooperation with the investigation, and they may rely on those 
statements, but exculpatory statements are by and large ignored.  It appears, then, 
that the state’s primary interest in punishing defensive deception is strategic 
efficiency rather than substantive truth-seeking. 
                                                          
43
 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 208.20, Comments (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1957) cited in Bennett L. 
Gershman, The “Perjury Trap,” 129 U. PA. L. REV. 624, 625 n.4 (1981); see also id. at 632 n.23 
(“The grand jury is in many ways a legal fiction, clothing with respectability, neutrality and 
independence what are in truth the actions of the prosecutor.”). 
44
 See Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352, 360 (1973) (noting that perjury prosecutions are 
not, in our adversary system, “the primary safeguard against errant testimony”; it is the 
questioner’s burden to “pin the witness down to the specific object” of inquiry). 
45
 Compare H. Richard Uviller, Evidence of Character to Prove Conduct: Illusion, Illogic, and 
Injustice in the Courtroom, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 845, 845 (1982) (“The process of litigation is 
designed for the reconstruction of an event that occurred in the recent past . . . for the most part, 
the rules by which a trial is conducted are supposed to enhance the accuracy of the synthetic 
fact.”) and Roger C. Park, Character at the Crossroads, 49 Hastings L.J. 717, 749-54 (1998) (trials 
primarily aim at truth-seeking) with Sanchirico, Evidence Tampering, supra note 34 at 1287 
(“[U]ncovering microhistorical truths about past transactions and occurrences is not, in fact, the 
primary purpose of trial . . . trial’s primary purpose lies not in discovering what happened, but in 
shaping what happens.”) and Charles R. Nesson, The Evidence or the Event? On Judicial Proof 
and the Acceptability of Verdicts, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1357, 1359, 1362-63 (1985) (noting that the 
aim of the factfinding process is to “generate acceptable [verdicts]” rather than probable ones and 
suggesting that judicial process induces individuals to internalize the instruction of the law in their 
primary activities rather than finds out “what actually happened.”). 
46
 United States v. Medina de Perez, 799 F.2d 540, 546 (9th Cir. 1986). 
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On the more level playing field of the courtroom, perjury is deterred 
through formal mechanisms designed to get at the truth rather than enforcement 
strategies aimed at the defendant.  Many scholars have discussed the role of trials 
in shaping preferences,47 and trials do function as morality plays.48  But it is 
difficult to explain the particular context of perjury, and the differential 
enforcement with regard to investigative lies, through the lens of this primary 
activity purpose.      
In my view, the treatment of in-court deception is animated by the truth-
finding approach, and structural protections have the “dual purpose of deterring 
tampering and correcting litigation outcomes that are skewed by tampering that 
was undeterred.”49  Those safeguards distinguish investigative and institutional 
deception.  With regard to the former, the government is focused on asserting 
authority and the ex ante desire to control truth production; deterrence in the latter 
context is driven more by the ex post desire for an accurate outcome. 
 Other sanctions designed to prevent perjurers from testifying in the first 
place supplement the deterrent impact of the perjury statute, including discovery 
provisions requiring the disclosure of impeachment material, the potential 
revelation of prior convictions, and the admissibility of prior inconsistent 
statements.  The trial is then structured to make perjury more easily identifiable to 
fact finders should perjurers nonetheless take the stand, through the oath 
requirement, demeanor evidence, and the availability of information on which to 
make credibility judgments.  Federal Rule of Evidence 608(a), for example, 
allows an impeaching party to offer opinion or reputation evidence of a witness’s 
character for truthfulness and to inquire on cross-examination about prior conduct 
that suggests a poor character for truthfulness. 50  And cross-examination itself—
often described in Wigmore’s terms as “the greatest legal engine every invented 
                                                          
47
 Sanchirico, Evidence Tampering, supra note 34, at 1287; id. at 1316 (the law of evidence 
tampering is “an area where the goal of finding truth ex post is a poor proxy for the goal of 
shaping truth ex ante”); see also Solum & Marzen, supra note 26, at 1232 (“[O]ur desire to find 
the truth is subordinate to our desire, in effect, to shape it through the provision of incentives.”). 
48
 William J. Stuntz, Self-Defeating Crimes, 86 VA. L. REV. 1871, 1882 (2000) (the “public 
nature” of criminal trials, “and the rituals that surround them, seem designed for sending 
messages”). 
49
 Sanchirico, Evidence Tampering, supra note 34, at 1316. 
50
 See, e.g., Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Worst Evidence Principle: The Best Hypothesis as to the 
Logical Structure of Evidence Law, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1069, 1086 (1992) (emphasizing the 
prevention of perjury as a core function of the rules of evidence:  [C]ommon law judges “were 
acutely interested in both deterring and exposing perjury [and] the liberal admissibility of 
character evidence of untruthfulness advances both objectives.”) see also Friedman, supra note 8, 
at 639 (“[I]n some circumstances a prior crime may have sufficient bearing on the truth-telling 
inclination of a witness, other than an accused, to warrant admissibility . . . even if the prior crime 
did not in itself involve dishonesty and was not particularly serious, and even if it occurred rather 
remotely in the past.”) . 
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for the discovery of truth”51—is a structural safeguard designed to expose perjury 
and enhance truth-seeking.   As the Supreme Court explained in Bronston when it 
articulated the limitations on perjury prosecutions in part as a function of the 
alternative means to prevent perjury:  “It is the responsibility of the lawyer to 
probe; testimonial interrogation and cross-examination in particular, is a probing, 
prying, pressing form of inquiry.  If a witness evades, it is the lawyer’s 
responsibility to recognize the evasion and to bring the witness back to the mark, 
to flush out the whole truth with the tools of adversary examination.”52 
 Thus, rather than imposing direct penalties by separately charging 
obstruction or perjury, exposing “evidence destruction” procedurally can punish 
“detection avoidance by effectively increasing the probability of sanction for the 
conduct whose detection is being avoided.”53 
 
MITIGATING EXPRESSIVE HARMS IN THE FALSE STATEMENTS CONTEXT 
 
In court, the focus is on the detection and deterrence of falsehood, and the 
structure of trial both guards against and signals the seriousness of perjury.  
Perhaps few perjurers are prosecuted per se, but many are “caught” and 
sanctioned in the web of procedure itself:  Lies are exposed, witnesses 
disbelieved, and defendants convicted despite their heartfelt denials to juries.   
In the false statements context, there is no such balance between ex ante 
and ex post preference-shaping.  Under current enforcement policy, prosecutors 
pursue false statements without regard to the harm they cause to investigations 
and with an eye instead on their utility as substitutes for primary wrongdoing.  
The aggressive pursuit of defensive lies has some counterproductive effects.  
Leveraging defensive false statements can ultimately produce less information 
because witnesses who have no exposure at all may not cooperate for fear of 
running afoul of section 1001.    Janice Nadler has also observed that “the 
expressive power of law can backfire when a law inadvertently generates 
disrespect,” for example by sending a message that everyone cheats on taxes.54  
Scandals about athlete-doping created the widespread perception that drug use 
was the norm and necessary to compete.  Likewise, frequent prosecutions of 
                                                          
51
 5 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1367 (3d ed. 1940). 
52
 Bronston, 409 U.S. at 358 (emphasis added). 
53
 Chris William Sanchirico, Detection Avoidance, 81 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1331, 1379 (2006) (noting 
the possibilities of sanctioning evidence destruction “by effectively increasing the probability of 
sanction for the conduct whose detection is being avoided”); see also id.  at 1380 (“The SEC, for 
example, might explicitly announce a kind of counterpunch strategy; should it come across 
evidence of obstructive behavior in the course of investigating insider trading, for instance, it 
would respond by stepping up the investigation of insider trading.”). 
54
 Janice Nadler, Flouting the Law, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1399, 1402 (2005) (citing Dan M. Kahan, 
Trust, Collective Action, and Law, 81 B.U. L. REV. 333, 342 (2001)).   
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harmless falsehoods, which detract from a clear focus on the most salient cases of 
deception and obstruction, might suggest that lying to the government is both a 
standard and an understandable response to investigative inquiries. 
In terms of general compliance, section 1001 prosecutions may ultimately 
undermine legitimacy if they appear “not to reflect community notions of desert 
but rather as a tool of a powerful government to intervene destructively in the 
lives of ordinary people.”55  There is some social science evidence supporting a 
“flouting thesis,” according to which the perceived illegitimacy of one legal 
outcome negatively impacts the willingness to comply with unrelated laws, both 
major and minor.  “When a person evaluates particular legal rules, decisions, or 
practices as unjust,” Janice Nadler has concluded, “the diminished respect for the 
legal system that follows can destabilize otherwise law-abiding behavior.”56  
Instead of reinforcing the authority of the government and enhancing public 
confidence in criminal justice institutions, false statements prosecutions occurring 
beyond the margins of recognizable harm may raise “ethical issues about the 
state’s power in relation to the individuals on whose behalf it exercises power.”57  
Public conceptions of legitimacy focus on procedural justice when the authorities 
“have imposed themselves on a person” and contact with the authorities has not 
been “freely chosen.”58  When government investigators impose themselves and 
then bring strategic prosecutions according to crude boundaries, that interaction 





Considering investigative and institutional lies separately, and evaluating their 
different scopes and contrasting incentive structures, highlights some opportunity 
for reform in the false statements context.  The balance between limited 
enforcement and procedural deterrence in the perjury context may offer a better 
imperfect approach to false statements.  Formalizing more investigative 
interactions in settings such as proffer-protected interviews in prosecutors’ 
offices, offering warnings about potential liability for false statements before 
questioning, and distinguishing active obstruction from passive responses could 
all mitigate some of the expressive distortions that arise from prosecuting organic 
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 Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 N.W. U. L. REV. 453, 481 (1997). 
56
 Nadler, supra note 54, at 1401. 
57
 PETER BROOKS, TROUBLING CONFESSIONS 1-2 (2000).   
58
 TOM TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 83 (1990). 
59
 See PAUL H. ROBINSON & JOHN M. DARLEY, JUSTICE, LIABILITY, AND BLAME 202 (1995) 
(concluding that “each time the criminal law convicts a blameless person, it calls into question, in 
some small way, the legitimacy of every other criminal conviction.”). 
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deception.  Limiting prosecutions to those cases in which the primary activity 
involves serious wrongdoing and false statements actually harm investigations 
could also lead to better sorting.  In the perjury context, precise questioning and 
literal falsehoods are prerequisites for liability.  In Bronston, the Court held that if 
“a witness evades, it is the lawyer’s responsibility to recognize the evasion and to 
bring the witness back to the mark.”60  In Brogan, however, the Court concluded 
that “disbelieved falsehoods” can give rise to liability because “making the 
existence of this crime turn upon the credulousness of the federal investigator (or 
the persuasiveness of the liar) would be exceedingly strange.”61  But the 
materiality standard in section 1001 ought to have some independent content that 
would more closely align the standards for investigative and institutional 
deception.  Whether a statement “actually influenc[es] or ha[s] a natural tendency 
or capacity to influence a decision or function of a federal agency” should require 
some attention to the impact of a statement.  Although the inquiry need not start 
with the subjective vantage point of a particular investigator, it should focus on 
the likely effect of a given statement or omission on a reasonable investigator 
under the circumstances.  If enforcement strategies against evidentiary foul play 
were thus fashioned as tests for accurate information rather than traps for the 
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 Bronston, 409 U.S. at 358. 
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 Brogan, 522 U.S. at 402.   
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